Courses / Commodity & FX Hedging

When hedging goes wrong — four case studies

Four documented ways a correct-looking hedge destroys money: the roll, the margin call, the basis, and the contract that died while its hedge lived on.

Module 10 of 144 lessonsAbout 50 minQuiz: 6 questions
Hedge

Lesson 1 · free to read

The roll that ate the crop — hedge-to-arrive, 1995-96

Everything in module 6 said a roll is a calendar-spread trade whose price is the spread. This is what happens when nobody prices it.

The instrument. A hedge-to-arrive (HTA) contract fixes the futures leg of a farmer's sale and leaves the basis to be set later. The buyer sells futures against it and passes the futures result back to the farmer, so economically the farmer is short futures. Contracts of the era let the farmer roll delivery to a later month — frequently without limit, frequently into the next crop year — for a fee of one or two cents a bushel. A cheap fee attached to an unbounded exposure.

The market. A short 1995 US corn crop met record exports. Old-crop corn ran above $5.00 while new-crop stayed near $3.40, and deliverable stocks at the exchange fell to minimal levels. That shape — nearby far above deferred — is an inversion (backwardation), and Working's theory of the price of storage explains why: when stocks are scarce, the market pays a premium for grain now and refuses to pay anyone to store it.

The mechanism, in one sentence. Rolling a short position forward through an inversion means buying back the expensive nearby month and selling the cheaper deferred month — and the difference is realised, banked, gone. Iowa State's worked case puts a May-1996 July-to-December roll at −$1.59 per bushel, against a normal roll differential of twenty to thirty cents. Iowa recorded roll costs reaching $1.60/bu.

The fatal misunderstanding. Farmers held on, waiting for the market to come back. But flat price coming back never recovers a spread loss that has already been realised — the money left on the roll, not on the price. In Iowa State's Example 3 the net realised price was $1.01/bu, against $2.45 expected and $3.45 that a plain unrolled HTA would have delivered.

The damage. Roughly 400 million bushels had been sold that did not exist. Iowa losses ran $90–120 million; national estimates reached $800 million to $1 billion. Elevators failed — one default book equalled 70% of a co-operative's equity — and six Iowa co-ops ended up suing fifty-nine of their own members. Note where the loss landed: the elevator netted exactly the cash price; the producer absorbed all of it.

The aftermath. The CFTC's May 1996 guidance required mandatory delivery, harvest-crop-year reference months, and rolls only sequentially within a single crop year; its ALJ later found one co-op's "Flex HTA" to be an illegal off-exchange futures contract (47 million bushels rolled against three to five million delivered). But the Seventh Circuit in Nagel (2000) enforced HTAs as forward contracts. Regulation refunded nobody — which is the point of studying it rather than trusting that rules will catch it next time.

What a system must therefore do. Show the signed spread cost in $/bu and in total before every roll is confirmed, labelled carry or inverted, and state plainly that the cost is permanent. Hard-block rolls across a crop-year boundary and multi-year rolls — refuse, not warn. Cap the roll count per contract explicitly rather than leaving it unbounded. Keep an immutable per-roll audit: timestamp, from and to month, both leg prices, the spread, the fee, the resulting adjusted reference price, and who authorised it. And validate contracted bushels against producible acreage, because 400 million phantom bushels is what an unvalidated quantity field looks like at scale.

The rest of this module

  1. The hedge was right and the firm still died — margin as liquidity risk
    A short hedge is cash-flow negative exactly when the physical gains value. Automating the hedge automates the margin call.
  2. "One hundred per cent hedged" — the basis that did not converge
    Hedging converts price risk into basis risk. Basis risk is not small, and convergence is a design feature that has failed.
  3. The contract died and the hedge lived on — counterparty default
    When a producer walks away, the futures leg does not vanish with the physical. A hedge silently becomes a speculative position — discovered by conversation, not by any event feed.

Carry on with the course

The other lessons and the quiz are in the course itself, where your progress is saved and counts towards the certificate: Commodity & FX Hedging Operations.

Next module: Options and non-linear instruments (advanced)